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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
RAY L. CRAWFORD, VIRGINIA
CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT CRAWFORD,
KELLER J. CRAWFORD and
MARY ELLEN LAUGHTER,
Plaintiffs and
Appellants,
Case No. 57025
vs.
FRANK ARTHUR MANNING,
Defendant and
Respondent.
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Appellants herein are the adult children of the deceased
and have brought a wrongful death action against the respondent
for the death of their mother.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The facts were tried to the Court sitting with a jury,
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, District Judge, presiding.
At the conclusion of deliberations, the jury returned a verdict
in favor of respondent and against appellants, no cause of
action.

Appellants, thereafter, filed a motion for a new trial

which was denied by the Court.

They, thereafter, filed this appeal.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent seeks affirmance of the Trial Court's Order
denying appellant's Motion for New Trial.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The case was to be tried to a jury.

At the time the

prospective jurors were being questioned by the court concerning
their qualifications to sit in the matter, the Trial Judge,
the Honorable John F. Wahlquist, indicated to the jurors that
the case was one brought under the "Wrongful Death Statute11
for the death of the mother of the plaintiffs.

Thereafter,

the judge stated to the jurors:
"Some people look at this statute as blood money,
others like it."
The court thereafter inquired of the jurors as to whether or
not any of them had any preconceived notions about the law
suit and asked whether or not any of them had any particular
feelings one way or the other about litigation arising from a
claimed wrongful death.

At this point, one of the women jurors

indicated to the court that:
11

1 have very strong feelings toward anyone who would
sue to recover money for the death of another.11

Upon hearing the comment, Judge Wahlquist then very carefully and cautiously inquired of the prospective juror whether
or not she could try the issue fairly and honestly and render
a just verdict based upon the instructions given her by the
court and whether or not she could apply the law to the evidence
as given to her by the court.

The Judge carefully inquired as

to her state of mind and attempted to expose her feelings in
the matter.

Having done so, the juror was then again asked by

the court whether or not the juror could properly and fairly
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hear the evidence and try the case without bias or prejudice.
The juror then responded to the court's inquiry indicating
that she could disregard any pre-conceived notions that she .
might have had and that she could fairly and honestly decide
the case.

The Judge then further inquired of this juror as

well as all other jurors to be selected as to whether or not
each and every one of them could set aside any personal feelings or inclinations that they might have concerning this
type of case and hear the evidence and render a decision in
accordance with the court's instructions in a fair and
impartial manner.

All of the jurors, including the lady in

question, indicated affirmatively that they could conduct
themselves accordingly.

Thereafter, counsel for plaintiffs

approached the bench and requested the court to dismiss the
one women juror that had heretofore made the comment or inquiry
on the ground that she appeared to be prejudiced to the case
and to plaintiffs' cause and that the court should dismiss
her for cause.

The trial judge indicated to counsel that

the jurors had generally been qualified for the cause. After
answering all the questions previously put to them, the court
then denied plaintiffs' request that the juror be dismissed
for cause.

A selection of the jury was then made with the

plaintiffs exercising a peremptory challenge to remove the
woman juror from the list.
Plaintiffs now complain that the trial judge should not
have inquired of the jurors concerning their feelings they
-3-

might have about the "Wrongful Death Statute11 and that he
committed reversible error in failing to dismiss the particular juror in question for cause.
POINT URGED FOR AFFIRMANCE
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
ARGUMENT
POINT 1
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY REFUSED TO GRANT APPELLANT'S MOTION
FOR NEW TRIAL.
It is the duty of the trial judge when impaneling a civil
jury to inquire of the jurors, either personally or through
the assistance of counsel, as to the general qualifications of
the jurors and of any prejudices or feelings they may have
concerning the issues to be tried.

It is of necessity that

the trial judge generally inform the jurors as to the type of
case to be heard so that the court and counsel can elicit from
the prospective jurors any information they desire reflecting
upon the qualifications of the jurors to hear the matter.
Rule 47 of the Utah Rule of Civil Procedure provides that the
court or counsel should examine the prospective jurors. This
is discretionary and within the clear authority of the trial
judge to inquire of the jurors concerning the state of mind
of the jurors.

The court must determine whether or not any

of the jurors are partial or would be prejudiced in such a
manner they could not fairly and honestly try the case.
Inquiries made by the court are rarely held to be error, the
-4-

lack of inquiry posing an altogether different problem.

The

Arizona Supreme Court clearly set forth the rule to be followed
in the case William H. Evans vs. Vera Mason, 82 Ariz. 40, 303
P. 2d 245.

In the Evans case, the Supreme Court of Arizona

stated:
"We correctly stated that the purpose of voir dire
examination of jurors is to determine the real state
of their minds so that a fair and impartial jury can
be chosen, and to this end the allowance of a question
rarely constitutes reversible error though refusal to
permit one to be asked may sometimes be. The line of
interrogation objected to might well have produced
answers that would have induced counsel to exercise
his rights of peremptory challenge."
It is within the sound discretion of the trial judge in
asking or permitting the questions to be asked of potential
jurors to elicit from them their qualifications, prejudices
or the lack thereof.

In exercising such discretion, the trial

judge should not be reversed unless it is shown that the judge
abused his discretion in the matter, resulting in prejudicial
error.

There is a presumption that the trial court in exer-

cising matters of discretion has done so properly.

Only by

clear and convincing evidence should such presumption be
destroyed.

Mayne vs. Turner, 468 P. 2d 369, 24 Utah 2d 195.

The court's authority in such matters is clearly set
forth in 47 AmJur 2d, Jury, page 789, Sec. 200, wherein the
author states:
"It is the duty of the trial judge on the impanelment of a jury to assure himself that each member of
the jury is unbiased and that no one of them is disqualified. Whether the trial judge conducts the
voir dire examination of the prospective jurors, or
whether the examination is conducted by counsel for
one party or the other, the trial judge may and should
exercise wide and liberal discretion with reference
-5-

to the scope of inquiry of and concerning the prospective juror, and in the exercise of his discretion,
the trial judge may properly limit the extent of the
examination upon any of the particulars of qualifications of the juror. On the other hand, a trial court1s
broad discretion as to the questions to be asked in
voir dire is nonetheless subject to the essential
demands of fairness.11
"The form of questions to be asked of prospective
jurors on voir dire examination is within the sound
discretion of court.
It is respectfully submitted that the trial judge commited
no error as alleged by appellants herein and that he exercised
a proper motive in making his inquiries.
Nevertheless, appellants complain of the inquiries made
by the trial judge concerning the feelings of the jurors prior
to their selection.

If such inquiry had not been made by the

court, appellants1 counsel would have been left with little or
no knowledge of the thoughts of the jurors concerning the type
of case in question.

The facts clearly indicate that the court1s

inquiry was most beneficial to the appellants rather than of
any harm to them.
The court very carefully questioned the juror about her
ability to fairly and honestly try the case and did so with
each and every other juror to be selected.

Each responded

that he could hear the case honestly and without bias to any of
the parties.

Having received such a response from the jurors,

the court properly ruled that there was no grounds for challenging
any of the jurors for cause.

The court's exercise of its dis-

cretionary authority in the matter is clearly set forth in the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

-6-

Appellants refer to certain text authorities concerning
conduct of judges not permitting fair trials as grounds for
reversal.

Such a general statement of the law is undoubtedly

accurate.

However, it is incumbent upon the appellants to show

that the judge1s remarks or conduct were in fact prejudicial
and deprived the appellants of a fair trial.

It is respect-

fully submitted that the trial judge herein inquired of the
jurors of their feelings and elicited certain information from
the jurors which he thought would be helpful to counsel in making
their selection of the jury.

The court neither expressed an

opinion in favor of or adverse to the position of any of the
parties.

Counsel also points out and cites a case wherein

it was stated "numerous comments or remarks11 were made by a
trial judge which created misconduct in his part.
There is nothing in the record or in appellants1 brief to
indicate that the trial judge in the instant case made more than
one inquiry on the issue in question.

The court simply performed

its duty of inquiry so that an intelligent selection of jurors
could be made.

The court's denial of appellants1 motion for a

new trial was neither unreasonable nor arbitrary and should be
affirmed.

Highland vs. St. Marks Hospital, 427 P. 2d 736, 19

Utah 2d 134.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (Rule 47).

Rule 47f of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure specifically
provides the basis for which a challenge for cause may be exercised and leaves to the sound discretion of the trial judge
whether or not a prospective juror should be dismissed for cause.
-7-

In absence of an abusive discretion, the trial judge1s
ruling should be affirmed.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that no error has been shown
by appellants herein.

In their brief, appellants1 counsel

infers that the trial judge expressed certain facial and voice
indications of displeasure with the statute.

Such an inference

is totally without merit and not worthy of further comment.
Respectfully submitted,
BAYLE AND LAUCHNOR
F. ROBERT BAYLE
Attorneys for Respondent
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